MICHEL MARTIN, HOST:
For more on this new phase of the Trump administration's sanctions campaign, Adam Szubin is with us now. He served in the Treasury Department in the administrations of George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Donald Trump's first term, including nearly a decade as the director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control. He's now a professor of practice at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Welcome. Thank you for joining us.
ADAM SZUBIN: Thank you for having me.
MARTIN: Well, you played an instrumental role in pressure campaigns against Iran. How do you think about Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent's new campaign of sanctions? How do you assess it?
SZUBIN: Well, I think the first thing to remember when we talk about the U.S. imposing sanctions on Iran is that the U.S. really can't impose any sanctions on Iran - not directly, because the U.S. doesn't have any business or banking ties with Iran, and we haven't for decades. So the whole game here is, how can the U.S. get third countries to constrain their ties with Iran, whether that's China, as we were just talking about, or places like Turkey, places like India.
And so what I took note of from Secretary Bessent's remarks was - he talked about a quiet outreach campaign with people from Treasury and State going out to capitals around the world to persuade them that this is in their interests, to be cutting off and cracking down on Iranian sanctions evasion.
MARTIN: So let's talk about China, a customer of Iran's crude oil. A spokesperson for China's foreign ministry said that they opposed Trump's economic war against Iran - that pressure would not resolve the crisis with Iran. So given that, I mean, do you think that they're saying something privately that they're not saying publicly?
SZUBIN: I hope so, and I would bet they are. I mean, the - there's always a top-line remark from China that they oppose unilateral economic sanctions. But they cooperated with us back when we were trying to constrain Iran in 2013, under the Obama administration, by reducing their imports from Iran, and they might do so again. I think the key things to look at are - what are their energy and economic interests? What are their geopolitical interests? And do they think that the U.S. administration has a viable plan to bring the conflict to a close? And if those line up, then yes. I could see China cooperating to an extent.
MARTIN: But what - from what you've seen so far, does this administration have a viable plan to bring this conflict to a close? I mean, it already seems that they were wildly overconfident in some of their assumptions.
SZUBIN: Well, if you're talking about some of the things they say that are maximalist - regime change, regime collapse - I don't think China would view that as a viable plan. If what you're talking about is a deal under which Iran agrees, let's say, not to acquire any stockpile of enriched uranium - and my sense was that was being discussed in the talks that were being brokered by Oman back in February - then yes. I think that is a viable goal, and I think that's something that China would want to see happen.
MARTIN: But didn't - wasn't there already such an agreement, and this administration pulled out of that agreement? So whatever steps they take now - is that just getting the U.S. back to and the world back to where we were...
SZUBIN: Well...
MARTIN: ...In the JCPOA?
SZUBIN: Sadly, we're in a place now where that looks like a very positive end state - if we could get back to where we were in the JCPOA. Namely, Iran's nuclear program is entirely under constraint and under the eyes of an international body - the IAEA - and that there is no chance for any kind of imminent breakout. That's what we want to get back to. Of course, now we also need to see the Strait of Hormuz reopened. The good news there is China wants to see that, too.
MARTIN: So taking a step back, it appears that the U.S. and Iran are pursuing a strategy of economic combat, that this is now a fight about who has the higher tolerance for economic pain. Does that sound right to you?
SZUBIN: Yes. You're right to point out that the U.S. is sensitive to gas prices. Voters are obviously sensitive to that. And Iran is quite astute, and they watch our political calendar as well. They know that we're coming up on midterms and that there might be limits on how much pressure the U.S. is willing to take. So you're absolutely right about that, but we should remember that the Iranian economy is under severe duress right now. Inflation is out of control, and government revenues have been shrinking. So it is not out of the question that you would see Iran's leadership come to the table if they think, again, the U.S. has a viable set of asks and that the U.S. is a credible negotiating partner.
MARTIN: We only have about 30 seconds here, but would you be willing to estimate how long it would take to get to that point?
SZUBIN: You're asking a very hard question. I mean, when we sat down with Iran under the Obama administration, we originally allowed six months. That turned into 16 months. Negotiations take a lot of time, so I don't know how long it would take. But for them to come to the table - that could happen relatively quickly if they're so inclined.
MARTIN: That's former U.S. Treasury official Adam Szubin. He is now with Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Thank you so much.
SZUBIN: Thank you. Transcript provided by NPR, Copyright NPR.
NPR transcripts are created on a rush deadline by an NPR contractor. This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Accuracy and availability may vary. The authoritative record of NPR’s programming is the audio record.
